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PROHIBITION IN SEARCH OF A
RATIONALE: WHAT THE TAX CODE
PROHIBITS; WHY; TO WHAT END?
DEIRDRE DESSINGUE*
Abstract: Each Presidential election renews the thorny debate over the
appropriate role of churches and other religious organizations in
American political life. Although churches are subject to other
rearaints on political activity, the prohibition on church political activity
tinder section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code is the harshest in
terms of penalties. Faced with the extraordinary scope of the
prohibition as interpreted by the IRS, and perceived ► o ► -enforcement
of egregious violations, churches tend toward one or two extremes: they
either ignore the prohibition and endorse candidates or they avoid
legitimate i ► volvemetit with important policy issues.
. . . has no sphere, and the river of serious belief cannot be
dammed. The waters will flow where the waters will flow, because the Lord
will go where the Lond will go. 1
INTRODUCTION
In quadrennial cycle, Presidential elections renew the thorny de-
bate over the appropriate role of churches and other religious organi-
zations in American political life. 2 The 2000 election cycle in particu-
lar, witnessing the selection of Senator Joe Lieberman as the first
jewidt candidate on a major party Presidential ticket, placed the issue
front and center. This article explores, in the context of the larger
debate, the prohibition on church political activity under section
501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), its genesis, utility,
and appropriateness.
* The Inithor is Associate General Counsel of die United States C011fcrelICC. of Catho-
lic Bishops. I hC opinimis expressed herein arc her own.
I STEM LEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN 112 (2000).
2 The lerDi "church," as used herein. encompasses all religions faiths, traditions, and
denominations. and includes other . religions organizations that may 1101 constitute
"church" within the technical meaning of section 170(1) (I) (A) (i) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.
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Although churches are subject to other restraints on political ac-
tivity—the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and relevant re-
strictions under state and local law—the Code's prohibition is the
most restrictive and the harshest in terms of penalties.' Since the po-
litical activity prohibition is deemed absolute, any violation risks r evo-
cation of church tax-exempt status and consequent loss of deductible
contributions.'}
 In addition, the IRS may impose excise taxes under
section 4955 with respect to political expenditures made in contraven-
tion of the political activity prohibition.' The IRS may also seek an
immediate determination and assessment of income and excise taxes
due on account of flagrant political expenditures, and bring injutic-
3
 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 -455 (1994). From time to time, Federal Election Committee ("ITC")
interpretations are included in this Article when they provide useful guidance that is com-
patible with IRS interpretations.
See EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS MANI/ROOK ( RN! 7751) §3(10)1(1). But sef-! Lobbying and
Adivilles of Tax ExempI Organizations: Hearing Before the Sabeomm. on Ovenigld of the
Hou.se Comm, on Ways and ∎Ifeans, 100th Cottg., 1st Sess. 913-97 (1987) (statement of Law-
rence Gibbs, IRS Commissioner). Gibbs stated that "some consideration may he given to
whether, (ptalitatively and quantitatively, ... the activity is so trivial it is without legal
significance and, therefore, de minions." In introducing the 1954 amendment, Senator
Lyndon B. JoIntson stated "[Obis amendment seeks to extend the provisions of § 501 of
the House bill, denying tax-exempt status to not only those people who influence legisla-
tion but also to those who intervene in any political campaign Ott behalf of any candidate
fin. any public [Alice." 100 Cu.nte. Rm. S9604 (1954) (statement of Sen. Johnson). Of
course, mere extension of the treatment accorded exempt organizations engaged iu lobby-
ing activities would have resulted in the imposition of a "substantiality" test for political
activity rather than an outright prohibition.
3 The IRS has discretion to inipose the excise tax penalty in heir of revocation, depend-
ing on relevant facts and circuinstances, including the nature or the political intervention
and steps that have. been taken to prevent recurrence. See preamble, Final Regulations on
Political Expenditures by § 501(c) (3) Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,209 (Dec. 5, 1995).
Churches are subject to all initial 10% tax on each political expenditure. See I.R.C.
§ 4955(a) (I) (1994). The initial tax may be abated if the church establishes that its politi-
cal expenditure was not willful and flagrant, and has been corrected. Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4955-1(1). If the expenditure is not corrected, an additional tax equal to 100% of the
expenditure will be imposed. See I.R.C. § 4955(1)(1) (1994). In addition, a 21/2% tax still be
imposed on an "organization manager" who knowingly agrees to a political expenditure,
unless such agreement is tot willful or is due to reasonable cause. See id. § 4955(a) (2). Au
"organization manager" includes any church officer, director or trustee, or other individ-
ual with comparable responsibilities, as well as any church employee having authority or
responsibility with respect to the political expenditure. See id. § 4955(1) (2). If the organiza-
tion manager refuses to agree to correction, an additional 50% tax is imposed. See id.
§4955(b) (2). For any single political expenditure, the firsmier tax on the organii:ation
manager may not exceed $5,000 .and the second-tier tax may not exceed $10,000. See id.
§ 4955(c) (2).
July 29011	 Rationale fir Tax Code Prohibitions •	 905
live action to bar further political expenditures in a United States dis-
trict court.6
I. PROHIBITION'S OBSCURE ORIGINS AND WIDE REACH
In the 1913 income tax provisions, an accommodation was made
for exemption from taxation of religious, charitable, educational, and
scientific organizations. 7 This 'initial exemption, however, was not
conditioned on abstinence from political campaign activity. 8 In fact,
the express prohibition on political campaign activity did not become
part of the Code until 1954. This provision, which has had such
significant impact on the role of tax-exempt organizations in the po-
litical sphere, was added without the benefit of hearings, testimony, or
comment from affected organizations by then-Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson during Senate floor debate on the 1954 Code. It is likely that,
by means of the prohibition, LBJ sought to insure that the tax-exempt
6 See I.R.C. § 6852, 7409(a) (1) (1994). The IRS first nuts( notify the church of its in-
tention to seek an injunction unless the church immediately ceases its political expendi-
ut•es. See id. § 7409(a) (2) (A). Tile IRS must also conclude that the violation of the political
activity prohibition had been flagrant and that Mjunctive relief would be appropriate to
ilreVell I 1'111'111er political expenditures. See id. § 7409(a) (2)(B).
7 See BRUCE R. liortuNs, THE 1.„Aw OF TAX-ExEmPT ORGANI'ZAT'IONS 1 2-14 (70i ed,
1998).
8 Since. 1934, the Internal Revenue Code has restricted the lobbying activities of sec-
tion 501(c) (3) organizations, inchtding churches. See Revenue Act of 1934 (codified at 31
U.S.C. § 3103). While political campaign activity is strictly prohihited, lobbying may not
constitute more than an insttbstantial part of an organization's total activities. See I.R.C.
§501(c)(3). Lobbying includes built coin:to ing (direct lobbying) and urging the public 10
contact (grassroots lobbying) members of a legislative body, whether federal, state. or lo-
cal, for the purpose of proposing. supimrling, Or opposing legislation, or adv(watiatg the
adoption or rejection ()I' legislation. See Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-.501(c)(3)(ii) (as
amended in 1990). Legislation is defined to include: any action: (1) by Coitgress, a state or
local legislative body; or (2) by the public in a referendum, constitutional
amendment or similar procedure. Set! id. 'Elie section 501 (c) (3) lobbying limitation applies
both to lobbying that, is germane ro a church's religious purposes and to lobbying that is
nth. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185, 186. Neither the Code nor the regulations
define what is "substantial." A few emir/ cases suggest that the line between what is substan-
tial mut what is insubstantial lies somewhere between 5% and 15% of an organization's
total activities, as measured by tinte, effort, expenditure and oilier relevant factors. See
Haswell v. U.S., 500 F.2(1 1133, 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (16-20% of budget was substantial);
Murray Seasongood.,-. C.0111111'1% 227 F.2(1 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955) (less than 5% dine and
n•t was no! substantial). The IRS does not endorse any particular percentage safe liar-
bor, but would likely be more comfortable at !lie lower end of the spectrum. In 1976, Con-
gress enacted section 501(h) of the Code, an elective provision that established a sliding
scale of permissible lobbying expenditures based on the organization's total budget. See
I.R.C. §501(h) (1994). However, :t1 dicir own request, churches, ceniventions or associa-
tions or churches, and integrated auxiliaries of churches were made ineligible to elect
treatment under sect ion 501 (It) . See I.R.C. §§ 501 (11) (5), 4911 (f) (2),
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organizations that had supported Dudley Dougherty, his challenger in
the 1954 primary election, would not do so. again.9
The statutory language of section 501(c) (3) prohibits churches
from participating or intervening in political campaigns on behalf of
or in opposition to any candidate for public office." The regulations
recite that "action organizations"—those that participate or intervene,
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of, or in op-
position to, any candidate for public office—are not operated exclu-
sively for exempt purposes and cannot qualify for tax exemption un-
der section 501(c) (3). 11
 The regulations define a "candidate" as one
who offers himself or is proposed by others as a contestant for ali elec-
tive public office, whether national, state or local." Thus, a church
may support or oppose a candidate for non -elective public offic'e—a
Supreme Court justice—without jeopardizing its tax-exempt status."
When an individual "offers himself, or is proposed by others,"
and thus becomes a candidate for elective public office must be de-
termined on the basis of all relevant facts and circumstances, Clearly,
au individual who has announced his intention to seek election to
public office is a candidate. Additionally, even an individual who has
not formally announced an intention to seek elective office—and
even if he never actually becomes a candidate—can in appropriate
circumstances be considered a candidate for purposes of section
501(c) (3). 14
 Further, third parties may propose an individual as a
candidate and take steps to urge his election. However, the mere fact
that an individual is a prominent political figure is alone insufficient
9 See Deirdre Halloran & Kevin Kearney, Federal Tax Code Reshielions on Chwrh
Activity, 38 Gym. LAW. 105, l 06-08 (1998). See generally, Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored
in the Breach: A Historical Perspecthre of the Pmneable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by
Chun-lies, 42 B.C. L. lire. 733 (2001).
l" The language "in opposition to" was added by tile Revenue Act or 1987, Pub. L. No.
1(10-203, 10 Stat. 1330.
II Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-.501 (c) (3) (iii) (as amended in 1990).
P2 See id,
" CI id. However, if a non-elective appointment requires confirmation by a legklative
body, church activities in support of or opposition to the appointment would be classified
as lobbying activities subject to the insubstantiality limitation. See Gen. Coo ns. 11fent. 39,694
( jan. 21, 1988), In addition. the church may incur liability for tax under § 527 on account
of such activities. See infra note 21. Elective positions in a political party—e.g., precinct
committee members—are also considered "public offices" if they (1) :ire created by stat-
ute; (2) are continuing; (3) are not occasional or contractual; (4) possess tixed terms of
office; and (5) require an oath of' office. See Gen. Coons. Mem. 39,811 ( June 30, 1989).
14 See Tech. Adv. Mein. 91-30-008 (July 26, 1991). For example. Hillary Rodham
Clinton's famous "listening tour" of New York Stale, prior to her Ibrnial declaration as the
200(1 Senatorial candidate of the Demtwratic Party, qualified her as a candidate.
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to render him a candidate. "Some action must be taken to make one a
candidate, but the action need not be taken by the candidate or re-
quire his consent." 15
Despite the paucity of definitive guidance from either the legisla-
tive history or IRS regulations, the political activity prohibition has
been interpreted broadly to include a range of activity beyond the ob-
vious. A church may not, among other things, make statements that
support or oppose a candidate for elective public office, state of can-
didates, political party or political action committed& ("PAC") in a
sermon, .church bulletin, on a church website or in an editorial in a
church publication. 17 In addition, churches may not indirectly support
or-oppose any candidates by characterizing candidates with anti-family
or similar labels, using plus (+) and minus (—) signs, or other indica-
tions of candidates' agreement' (or lack thereof) with the church's
positions on particular issues. 18
A church also may not establish a PAC nor may it provide or so-
licit financial support to or for any candidate, political party, or PAC. 19
15 Judith E. kindell John F. Reilly, Election Year Issues, in 1902 IRS EXEMPT ORGANI-
zATIoNs CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL. EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM, 408
1 hereinafter Election Year Issues!.
16 As used Item, a political action committee is understood as a commitiee, whether
organized as a separate organization or as a segregated fund of an existing organization,
the purpose of which is to influence the election orally individual Io public office.
17 As the Iniernei has become a potent information delivery system, many churches
have come to rely on websites as a means of communicating their messages to members,
parishioners, and the world at large. The political activity prohibition applies with equal
force in cyberspace!. The IRS is currently soliciting comments on !low the prohibition
shotal apply in partiodar Internet simations. See Annomiconiont 2000-84, 2000-42 I.R.13.
385 (Oct. 16, 2000). Even without specific guidance, however, it is sale to predict that the
f011ovking habilitation posted on a church website would violate the political campaign
aclivity prohibition: links to candidates, PAC or political party wehsiles; candidate en-
dorseuients or statements of opposition: calls for members, parisliiimers or other users to
support or oppose a particular candidate or pally; biased voter guides or links therelo; and
links 10 other orgat dial ions' statements in suppuri of or opposition to candidates. Cf. id.
18 The IRS has taken the position, which has been upheld by the courts, that even
nonpartisan rating of elective judicial candidates as "approved," "not approved." or "ap-
proved as highly qualified," on the basis of experience, professional ability, and character,
cemstiimed prohibited political cainpaign activity, despite the fact iliat in certain cases all
candidates were "endorsed" as qualified. See Ass'ii of the Bar v. Coinm'r, 858 E2d 876,
880-82 (2d Cir. 1088) (upholding IRS position): Gen. Cowls. Meat. 39,441 (Sept. 27,
1985).
19 See 'rreas. Reg. § 1.527-6(g) (1980): Election Par Issues, supra note 15 at 437. A
church may, however, establish a separate segregated fund to engage in !hinted "political"
activities, such as supporiing candidates 1br nwfrelective public office, e.g., Supreme Court
justice ur cabinet officer. See Gen. Coitus. Mein. 39,604 ( . tau t. 21, 1988). flowerer, if such a
segregated fund were io engage in political campaign activities prohibited under section
501(c) (3), these activities would be attributed to the churcli and jeopardize exempt 500115.
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This includes loans," taking collections during worship services or at
other church functions, and in-kind support, such as free or selective
use of volunteers, paid staff, facilities, equipment, office supplies,
mailing lists," or use of church letterhead.
Churches may not distribute, or authorize distribution of, cam-
paign literature or biased voter education materials during worship
services, whether through member mailings or by other means. Also
prohibited is the placement of political signs or placards on church
In acklition. a church that engages in activities to influence the selection or appointment
of a cainlidate for nowclertive public office may be liable for tax under section 527. Section
527 of the Code imposes a tax at the highest corporate rate on the political activities of
section 501(c) organizations. Seel.R.C. § 527 (b) . Section 527 political activities are defined
as "the hinction of influencing or attempting to inf luence the selection, nomination. elec-
tion, or appointment of any individual to any federal, state or local public office or office
in a political organization." See I.R.C. § 527(0(2). To avoid imposition of section 527 tax,
an organization Insist form a separate segregated fund to make expenditures for political
activities, although it may not use its own corporate funds to do so. See I.R.C. § 527(f).
Based on its legislative history, section 527 has been interpreted as not applicable to sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations. See S. Rep. No. 93-1357, 1975-1 C.B. 517, 534. The IRS,
however, lots indicated that section 527 can apply to section 501(0(3) organizatibns in
certain circumstances. The definition of political activities in section 527 is broader than
that in section 501(c) (3), because it extends to non-elective public office, which is not re-
stricted by section 501(c) (3). Thus, a section 501(c) (3) organization may establish a sepa-
rate segregated fund for the limited purpose of conducting political activities within the
meaning of section 527 provided these activities are not political campaign activities within
the meaning of section 501(c) (3). If the hind meets the requirements of section 1.527-
2(a), it will be treated as a political organization subject to the provisions of section 527.
2° See Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-12-001 (Mar. 20, 1998), in which the IRS concluded that a
loan can be considered a contribution jeopardizing section 501(c) (3) exempt mini. even
when niarket rate interest is charged and the loan is repaid.
21
 Providing church mailing lists to candidates, political parties, or PACs on a preferen-
tial basis or without charge, or lending such lists to candidates, political parties, or PACs
violates the political activity prohibition. However, the IRS has indicated that a sectiol!
501(c) (3) organization that regularly sells or rents its !nailing list to other organizations
will not violate the political campaign activity prohibition if it sells or rents the list to a
candidate on the same terms that the list is sold or rented to others. provided the list is
equally available to all other candidates on the same terms."Eketion Year Issues, supra note
15, at 433. Iii addition, the rental of mailing lists to non-section 501 (c) (3) organizations,
including candidates. PACs. or political parties. may give rise to unrelated business income
tax liability. See 1.R.C. § 513(11) (1) (B). But See Sierra Club a. Comin'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 15311
(91It Cir. 1996) (concluding that income from one-time rentals of mailing lists constitutes
non-taxable royalty income); Common Cause v. Comm'r. 112 T.C. 332, 347 (1999);
Planned Parenthood of A111. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.111. (CCU') 2227 (1999). The IRS
determined in late 1999 to stop .
 litigating mailing list licensing cases unless the factual
record dearly established that more than insubstantial services were provided by the ex-
empt organization. See EOTR WEEKLY, Mar. 13, 2000, at 58. Ste also 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 237, 237 (2000) (reporting on fifty-three public radio stations criticized lOr swapping
donor lists during 1999 with the Democratic National Committee and other political or-
ganizations).
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property, including church-owned parsonages or rectories." Since
churches lack the ability to control access to adjacent public property,
such as public streets and sidewalks surrounding church property,
third-party distribution of partisan materials on public property gen-
erally is not attributed to the church. Although some court opinions
relating to the distribution of leaflets in shopping malls and parking
lots -suggest a contrary conclusion, generally church parking lots are
considered private property, since they are easily distinguishable, in
terns of both use and access, from community shopping centers,
mall's, and similar public venues." Accordingly, churches may not
authorize the distribution of biased or partisan campaign materials in
their parking lots..
-Churches and church-operated schools frequently permit . local
election authorities to use their auditorium and gymnasium facilities
as polling places on Election Day. Such activity is a manifestation of
civic duty, is nonpartisan, and does not violate the section 501(c) (3)
political campaign activity prohibition. To the extent political
leafleting is perniitted outside polling places under local election
rules, it is not attributable to the church. In addition, from time to
time churches may be asked to Make their facilities available for parti-
san political activities, such as party conventions or caucuses and can-
didate rallies. This occurs particularly in areas of the country where
alternative large-capacity venues are scarce. Such use of church facili-
ties is not per se prohibited. ,However, to insure that any partisan activ-
ity is not attributed to the church, the following precautions should
be followed: (1) the church facility must not be provided free or at a
reduced charge; (2) if the facility ordinarily is made available only to
church-related users, it should not be made available to candidates or
parties; (3) if the facility ordinarily is made available to outside users,
the facility may be made available to candidates/parties on the same
basis; (4) the facility should be available for all candidates/parties,
with no preferences for any particular candidate/party; and (5) the
church should not advertise, promote, or provide other services in
connection with any political event taking place in its facility.
22 The placeinent of political signs at personally owned clergy residences is likely per-
misSit4e, but may trigger IRS inquiry.
2
 Sw, e,g., Robins v. Prtmeyard Shopphig Cu'., 592 1'.2d 341, 341 (Cal. 1979), offil, 447
U.S. 74, 74 (1980); Nj. Coalition Against War in Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, 650 A.2d 757.
760 N.J.( 1904). But ve Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th
679, 679 (2000) (holding supermarket has legal right to deny entry to prig ate sidewalk for
purpose of soliciting signatures for clectiofn ballot petitions).
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Not all political involvement by churches is prohibited under the
Code. During election campaigns, churches may educate candidates
about the issues and attempt to change their positions on those issues,
and may educate voters about the issues and candidates' positions on
the issues. 24
 This may be accomplished through a variety of means,
including sponsorship of candidate forums and distribution of voter
education materials on incumbents' voting records and the results of
candidate polls or questionnaires. These voter education activities, if
unbiased in content, structure, format, and context, do not violate the
political activity prohibition. 25
For example, the IRS has concluded that a section 501(c) (3) or-
ganization that published and distributed, during an election cam-
paign, the voting records of all members of Congress on a wide range
of subjects did not violate the political activity prohibition. The voting
records were distributed annually (not merely during election years),
contained no editorial opinions, and contained no indication of ap-
proval or disapproval of incumbents' votes. 26
 The IRS has suggested
criteria for evaluating whether distribution. of incumbents' voting rec,
ords serves as an appropriate voter education activity, including: (1)
whether incumbents are identified as candidates; (2) whether incum-
bents' positions are compared to the positions of other candidates;
(3) whether incumbents' positions are compared to the church's posi-
tions; (4) the timing, extent, and, manner of distribution; and (5) the
breadth or narrowness of the issues presented in the voting record. 27
On the other hand, the IRS has concluded that the distribution
during an election campaign of a biased voting record—one that indi-
cated whether legislators voted in accordance with the sponsoring or-
ganization's position—avoids violating the political campaign activity
prohibition only in very limited circumstances: (I) the voting record
does not identify candidates for re-election; (2) its distribution is not
timed to coincide with any election, but rather is one of a series of
regularly distributed voting records; (3) the distribution is not tar-
geted to areas where elections are occurring; and (4) the voting rec-
21
 If, however, a candidate is an incumbent legislator, ilieSe activities could constitute
lobbying activity subject to the general insubstantiality limits olseetion 501(c) (3).
25
 The Code does not define -bias." As a general rule, however, activities or publica-
tions are considered biased if, upon review or all relevant facts and circumstances. they
indicate or imply that a candidate agrees or disagrees with the church's positions, or vice
versa.
26 SIW Rev. Rid. 78-248,1978-1 C.B. 154 (Situation 1).
27
 See Election Par Issues, supra note 15, at 419-20,
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ord is not broadly disseminated to the electorate, but only to a limited
group, such as organization members or subscribers to its publica-
tion.28 Perhaps the most controversial IRS voter education ruling con-
cluded that broad distribution of voting records or other voter educa-
tion materials that do not cover a wide variety of issues violates the
polil ical activity prohibition, even in the absence of overt bias. 29
Distribution by churches of voter guides prepared by unrelated
organizations was a particularly contentious issue during the last two
Presidential election cycles, one that presents a number of potential
difficulties. Because the church did not prepare them, it is difficult, if
not impossible, for the church to evaluate whether the questionnaire
or instrument used to compile information about the, candidates was
free front bias, whether there was improper contact between the pre-
paring organization and any candidate, and whether the presentation
accurately reflected candidates' positions on the issues. In addition,
the organization preparing the voter guide frequently is not a section
501(c) (3) organization, and is not subject to the political activity pro-
hibifion. Thus, while distribution of these voter guides may pose no
risk to the preparing organization, it may jeopardize the tax-exempt
status of the distributing church. The problem is exacerbated when
the outside voter guide is accompanied by a self-serving legal opinion
assuring churches that the guide is "perfectly legal."
Churches must exercise care when they prepare their own voter
guides based on candidate questionnaires. They must follow IRS crite-
ria for determining whether publication of candidate questionnaire
responses violates the political activity prohibition: (1) whether the
queitionnaire is sent to all candidates; (2) whether all responses are
published; (3) whether the questions indicate bias toward the organi-
zation's preferred answer; (4) whether the responses are compared to
the organization's positions on the issues; (5) whether the responses
are published as received, without editing by the organization; and
(6) whether a wide range of Issues is covered." The IRS has con-
28, See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
29 See Rev. Rill. 78-248, 1978-1 Ca. 154 (Situation 4).
5° See Elation rear 'soars, copra note 15. at 421: Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154
(Situation 4). 111 addition, no coordination, cooperation, Or consultation with candidates
or their committees may lake place. See FEC Christian Coalition, 52 F. Stipp. 2d 45, 45
(1).D.C., 1999) (conchiding that a non-501(c) (3) organization's voter guides did not con-
stitute coordinated expenditures prohibited under the FEC.A, despite the fact that the
aeri.plides clearly indicated which candidates were preferred by the Christian Ctmlit ion);
11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c) (5) (as amended in 19%) (FECA mks on candidate coordination). It
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eluded that an organization that published the positions of all ca ► di-
dates in a particular race on a wide variety of issues selected solely on
the basis of their importance to the electorate as a whole did not vio-
late the political activity prohibition, where neither the questionnaire
nor the voter guide evidenced bias or preference in content or struc-
ture. 31
 Conversely, publication of responses to a candidate question-
naire that evidenced bias on certain issues did violate the political ac-
tivity prohibition.32
 When only one candidate responds, distribution
of his responses is problematic, The IRS has offered no guidance on
this issue, but the Federal Election Committee ("FEC") voter guide
rules require participation of at least two candidates. 33
Both IRS and FEC rules permit churches to sponsor voter regis-
tration and get-out-the-vOte drives, provided that no bias for or against
any candidate, political party, or voting position is evidenced. 34
 Voter
registration or get-out-the vote efforts should not be: (1) conducted
in cooperation with any political campaign; (2) targeted according to
the identity of the candidate; (3) based upon a candidate's or party's
agreement or disagreement with the sponsoring church's positions; or
(4) targeted toward members of a particular party. Targeting voter
registration drives at historically disadvantaged groups, whether based
on economic status, race, gender or language spoken, however, is
generally deemed unobjectionable. 35 Churches may also sponsor un-
biased public forums, debates, and lectures in which candidates ex-
plain their views to the public. Sponsoring churches may not insert
their views on the issues being discussed, comment on candidates'
responses, or in any other way indicate bias for or against a particular
candidate, party or position.36
 The IRS has identified the foll6wing
factors as important to a favorable determination on candidate fo-
must be remembered that FECA acceptability notwithstanding, Christian Coalition-type
voter guides evidencing bias would violate section 501 (c) (3).
31 See Rev. Rut. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (Situation 2).
32
 See id. at Situation 3.
55 Seel! C.F.R. § 114.4 (c) (5) (1996).
34 See id. at §114.4(d). Bias could, among other things, be indicated by distribution of
biased or partisan literature in connection with voter registration or get-out-the-vote drives,
by targeting registration or get-otu-the-vote drives toward individuals who support the
church's positions or a particular cat idittate or party, or by coordinating with candidates or
their committees.
35
 See Priv, Lira Rid. 92-23-051) (Mar. 10. 1992) (grants for registering homeless people
to vote did not constitute political activity for private foundation); Milton Cerny. Cam-
paigns, Candirlatm and Chafities.' Guideposts for Charitable Institutions, 19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON
TAN PLANNING rout 501(c) (3) Otte. 5.13—.17 (1991).
56 Cf. Rev. Rid. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210.
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ruins: (1) all legally qualified candidates are invited to participate; 37
(2) questions are prepared and presented by an independent nonpar-
tisan panel; (3) topics discussed cover a broad range of issues of in-
terest to the public; (4) each candidate has an equal opportunity to
present his or her views on the issues discussed; and (5) the modera-
tor does not comment on questions or otherwise imply approval or
disapproval of any candidate. 38
.The IRS also has indicated that whether a church may invite a
candidate to speak at a sponsored event depends upon all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the invitation, and whether the can-
didate is invited in his capacity as a candidate or in his individual ca-
pacity. If the individual is invited as a candidate, the criteria for public
forums, debates and the like apply. The IRS has further indicated that
the nature of the event to which' a candidate has been invited will be
considered in determining whether the candidate has been provided
requisite equal access. For example, if one candidate is invited to ad-
dres:.i the full congregation from the pulpit during a regular worship
service, and the opposing candidate is invited to speak at a small
prayer breakfast attended by only a handful of people, the church
would likely be found not to have provided equal access. The IRS has
suggested that a similar conclusiOn would be reached if a church were
to invite two opposing candidates "with the knowledge and eXpecta-
37 There ale circunistances in which candidates may be excluded, Fur example., a
wary election debate lnity be limited to legally qualified candidates seeking the nomination
of' a particular political party. See, e.g.. Fula'ni v. League of Won telt Voters Ed tIC. Fund, 882
F.2d 021, 630 (2d Cir. 1989). Further, the FEC has indicated that if the field of legally
qualified candidates islarge, the sponsoring orgattization may limit participatfcill based
upon "pre-established objective criteria." Any debate must inch ide at least two candidates
and must not promote or advance one candidate over another. See 1 1 C.F.R. § 110.13(1))
(1990). In addition, for a general election, .the spoi ► toring organization may not use
nomination by a particular political party as the sole olljective criterion for participation.
The IRS has suggested the following criteria for determining whether the failure to invite
all legally qualified candidates violates the political activity prohibition: (1) whether invit-
ing all legally qualified candidates was impractical; (2) whether the sponsoring organiza-
tion adopted reasonable, objective criteria for determining which candidates to invite; (3)
whether the criteria were applied consistently and non-arlMrarily to all candidates; and (4)
whether other relevant factors indicate the debate was cmidttcted in a neutral, 1 rampart isan
manner. S Election Year Issnes, supra note 15 at 424. For example, the IRS! has approved a
candidate formn with participation limited to Iwo major party candidates phis up to four
additional candidates posting at least 15% popular support, as determined by an inde-
pendent statewide poll. Seen-is% Dr. Rid. 90-35-003 (Aug. 30, 199(1).
38- See Rev. Rid. 80-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73, 74; Election Par Issues, supyi note 15, at 423.
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tion that one would not accept the invitation because of well-known
opposing viewpoints. "39
If a candidate is invited to speak in his capacity as a public figure
or expert, it is not necessary to provide equal access to other candi-
dates.4° The following precautions, however, should be observed to
avoid violating the political campaign activity prohibition: (1) the
candidate must speak only in his capacity as expert or public figure;
(2) no mention should be made of his candidacy; (3) no campaign
activity should occur in 'connection with the candidate's appearance;
and (4) all publicity regarding the candidate's attendance should
identify the expert or public-figure capacity in which lie is appearing
and should not mention his candidacy. The IRS has also indicated
that if the primary purpose of an invitation is to showcase an individ-
ual's candidacy, the organization may be found to violate the political
campaign activity prohibition, even in the absence of campaign activ-
ity.
. II. INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY
It cannot be over-emphasized that the political activity prohibi-
tion applies to churches as tax-exempt organizations. The prohibi-
tion, however, does not purport to curtail the political activities of
church members or church leaders acting in their individual capaci-
ties. Nevertheless, care must be taken to avoid. confusion ai to
whether individuals, particularly church leaders, are acting in their
organizational or individual capacities. The 1991 IRS-approved press
release, which announced its settlement with Jimmy Swaggart Minis-
tries regarding political activity conducted during the 1986 presiden-
tial campaign, provided clarification on this attribution issue. 41 Gen-
erally, if an endorsement (or statement of opposition) takes place
during an official church function, or is included in the church's
official publication, the endorsement will be attributed to the
:19
 See Election Year Issues, supra note 15, at 431.
4D
 It au invitation is extended to a candidate on a public-figure basis, payment of a cus-
tomary honorarium ordinarily•ill not result in a violation of the political campaign activ-
ity prohibition, Imless the payni6t is intended to support the candidate's campaign. See id.
at 431-32.
11 See, Jimmy Swaggart, President, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, Public. Statement (Dec. 7,
1991) [hereinafter Sroaggart S'tatement].
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church.42 In addition, church members, employees, or leaders, may
"
not in any way utilize the [church's] financial resources, facilities or
personnel" in the course of engaging in individual political activity,
and must "clearly and unambiguously indicate that the actions taken or
statements made are . not [those] of the [church]." 43 Church lead-
ers acting in their individual capacities are permitted to use their
official titles to identify themselves, "so long as they make it clear that
they are acting in their individual capacity, that they are not acting on
behalf of the [church], and that their association with the [church] is
given for identification purposes only." 44 •
The FEC has concluded that directors of an exempt organization
may, in their individual capacities, establish an independent PAC, that
is, one unconnected with the organization.45 The IRS has identified
the following factors that suggest a PAC is not truly independent: (1)
similarity between the name of the PAC and the exempt organization;
(2) excessive overlap of directors; and (3) sharing of facilities between
the exempt organization and the PAC. 46
-4 See Election Yrar Issues, supra note 15, at 436 ("Actions and coninninications by the
ullicials of the organization that are of the same character alai method as authorized acts
and communications of the organization will be attributed to the organization.").
' 13 Straggarl Statement, salmi note 41 (emphasis addd). Agency principles apply in
evaluating authorization issues. Actions of church employees within the scope of their
employment generally %%•ll be treated as having been conducted with the chinch's anthori-
zation. In addition, individual actions will be attributed to a church if the church either
ratifies or fails to disavow individual actions peribrIned under the church's apparent
authority. See Gen. Colitis. Mein, 39,414 (Feb. 29, 1984); Election I'rar Issues, supra note 15,
at 43t.
44 Election Year hstirA, supra nine 15, at 435.
45 Ser0p, FEC 1984-12 (1984).
46 See Election Year Issues, supra note 15, at 438. Sitliilar attribution issues are raised when
a church proposes to create a related section 501(c)(4) organization to conduct prohib-
ited political activity cidier directly or through a related PAC:. In order to avoid "conduit"
pitfidk, the church and ally related section 501 (c) (4) organization must maintain separate
hooks and recOrds, and nunst insure that no tax-deductible church contributions toe used
to stilopori the political activities of the section 501 (c) (4) organization or its PAC. See Re-
gan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 540 (1983); Branch Ministries
Rossoni, 21,1 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Ci•. 2000) (clarifying the availability of a section
501(c)(3)-501(c)(4)-PAC organizational triad for clime]] political expression); Priv. Lir.
Rid, 98-50-025 (Dec. 11, 1998). A section 501(c)(4) organization may engage in political
activity that is prohibited for a section 501(c)(3) organization, provided it is not its pri-
mary activity. See Rev, Rul. 81-95,1981 C.11.33. The IRS l ets identified the following poten-
tial areas of abuse in tandem (c)(3)—(c)(4) relationships: (1) sharing of staff, facilities, or
other expenses betiveen the (c) (3) and (c) (4) organizations; (2) (undue .' of juin' activities
requiring an allocation of income and expenses; and (3) joint fund raising that utilizes the
(c) (3) organization's name Or goodwill. Sit Election Year Isms, s11/ern note 15, at 439-40;
Cerny, sn/na note 35, al 5.38—.44.
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III. PROHIBITION IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE
Because of the paucity of legislative history, attribution of ration-
ales to the political activity prohibition has been largely an exercise in
projection. The prohibition has thus evolved, at least as far as church
activity is concerned, into something of a constitutional-philosophy
Rorschach test. This is no more evident than in the organized efforts
of "watchdog" groups like Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State to report alleged church violations of the political
activity prohibition.47
 Supported by "wall of separation" rhetoric, such
efforts pander to public misperception that it is the First Amendment
that prohibits church political activity. 48
Although the political activity prohibition may coincide with the
strict separationist view, it is not constitutionally mandated. To the
contrary, the right to participate in the political process is a funda-
mental liberty protected by the First Amendment. This right extends
to churches no less than to secular institutions and private citizens. 49
Pluralistic society depends on a "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues ... be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," and on debate that embraces "discussions of candi-
dates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which gov-
ernment is operated or should be operated, and all such matters re-
lating to political processes."50
If, it fact, church political activity were constitutionally prohib-
ited, one would expect a political activity prohibition applied solely to
churches. (Such an application would, of course, fail to pass coustittt-
47 Its Nlarch 1996, Americans United announced "Project Fair Play," an election year
initiative designed to bring churches and religious groups into compliance with the tax
code. See Press Release, Americalts United for Separation of Clu and Slate, IRS Urged to
Investigate Influential Fundamenialist Chords (Afar. 19. 1996). This effort continued Iluouglt
the 2000 campaign cycle. See, e.g., J. Christine Harris, Americans United to Counter Christian
Coalition!$ thter Guides, 3(1 EXEN1PT ORG. TAX REV. 135. 135 (2000); Fred Stokekl, Group
Complains to IRS About Faluren Fund-Raising Letter, 28 ExuruPT ORG. Tax Ray. 464, 464
(2000); Fred Slokelcl, IRS Asked to Investigate Fahoeirs Voter Rigistration Drive, 28 EXEMPT
Oat:, TAX REV. 195, l95 (2000); Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Priests for Life Political Campaign Raises Serious Legal Questions,' Says Church-State
Il'atchdog Group (July 18, 2000).
48 Thomas Jefferson's inaccurate and misleading metaphor has become standard
shorthand for interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. See TkibMAS
JEFFERSON, 1802 Letter to Danlmry Baptist Churches in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THONIAS JEF-
FERSON 113 (Wash, ed. 1961). Runic Chief justice Rehnquist challenged reliance on this
metaphor in his dissent in Wallace v. jalfree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985).
48
 Seell'alz v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
5° N.Y. Times v, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 {1964); see Mills v. Alabama 384 U.S. 214,
218-19 {1966).
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tional muster on the grounds that it evidenced hOstility toward relig-
ion.) Whatever can be discerned about LB1s,motivation for introduc-
ing the political activity prohibition, there has never been an intima-
tion that silencing churches was intended or even considered.51 To
the contrary, the political activity prohibition is inclusive of all section
501(c) (3) organizations. Just as Establishment Clause challenges to
church tax exemptions have failed because churches had not been
singled out for exemption but were granted exemption among a wide
array of nonreligious groups, so the political activity prohibition is
defended against Free Exercise Clause challenges on the same
grounds—its neutral applicability to all section 501(c) (3) organiza-
tions. 52
Another rationale for the political activity prohibition is that gov-
ernment must not subsidize partisan political activity. The prohibition
"stem[s] from Congressional policy that the United States Treasury
should be neutral in political affairs and that substantial activities di-
rected to attempts to influence legislation or affect a political cam-
paign should not be subsidized." 53 This rationale is premised on an
understanding of tax exemption as a "subsidy" However, there is no
evidence that a subsidy theory of tax exemption was commonly ac-
cepted in 1954. Indeed, in a 1970 church property tax exemption
case,, Wa/z v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court concluded that "[t] ax
exemptions and general subsidies ... are qualitatively different." 54 In
tax exemption, the government does not transfer its funds to
churches, but merely "abstains from demanding that the church sup-
51 George Reedy, Hills chief aide, recalling events relating to the 1954 amendment, re-
lated to the author his belief that "Johnson would never Lave sought restrictions On relig-
ious organizations, but that is only an opinion, and I have no evidence." See Letter from
George Reedy to Deirdre Dessingue (Oct. 11, 1985) (on file with author). See generally
iel, supra note 9.
52 See Wolz, 397 U.S. at 670 11.52, as reinterpreted by Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
I, 12 (1989) (emphasizing wide applicability); el:, Employment. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
872 (1990) (concluding right of Tree exercise did not relieve obligation to comply with
valid or neutral law of general applicability even if it requires conduct contrary to religious
practice).
52 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849, 854 (I Oth Cir. 1972) (em-
phasis omitted). Christian Echoes was a nonprofit religious organization founded in 1951
by Dr. Billy James Hargis. The persuasiveness of this argument is eroded by the fact that
the political activities of other groups are to one degree or another subsidized by govern-
ment, fur example, the tax exemptions for PACs (I.R.C, section 527) and section 501(c) (4)
organizations.
54
 Compare 11 -idz, 397 U.S. at 1190 (Brennan, J., concurring) with id. at 705 (Douglas, J.,
(Ijssel aing) Mal tax exemption is a subsidy."),
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port the state."55 Dean M. Kelley, a noted First Amendment scholar,
has identified additional distinctions between subsidy and tax exemp-
tion.56 First, there is no subsidy amount predetermined by govern-
ment. Rather, the value of tax exemption depends on the level of con-
tributions to and expenditures by the exempt organization. Second;
there is an element of compulsion involved in a subsidy, through the
appropriation and taxation process, that is absent in tax exemption.
Third, there is no periodic review by government to approve, renew,
or maintain tax exemption, as is the case with subsidy. Filially, tax ex-
emption does not convert an exempt organization to an agent of
"state action," whereas government subsidy may. "No one has ever
suggested that tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or
hospitals into arms of the state or put employees 'on the public, pay-
Within a dozen years, however, this conceptual distinction was
abandoned. The Supreme Court concluded in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation that both tax exemptions and tax deductions were subsi-
dies, and as such could be conditioned upon certain behaviors, here,
refraining from substantial lobbying. 58 In Bob Jones University v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that as subsidy, exemption could even
be conditioned on adoptiOn of policies contrary to an organization's
religious beliefs.59 In Texas Monthly v. Bullock, an Establishment Clause
challenge to a sales tax exemption solely for religious publications,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the exemption-as-subsidy concept, and
clarified its holding in Wiz/z, stating that the breadth of property tax
exemption at issue had been an essential element in its conclusion
that the exemption for churches did not violate the Establishinent
Clause.°
r's N. at 675.
56 DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 32-34 (1977).
Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
58 See 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
59
 See 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983) (upholding the denial of tax exemption under sec-
tkin 591 (c) (3) on account of the university's racially discriminatory policies, which' were
found to be contrary to fundamental public policy). The university was a pervasively relig-
ious educational institution. The Court specifically reserved application of its holding to
"churches or other purely religious institutions." Id. at 604 n.20.
6° See 489 U.S. at 12. Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, disagreed, stating that the
Wait property tax exemption was justified because exemption constituted a reasonable
governmental attempt to avoid the "latent dangers" of stale hostility toward religion that
inhere in property taxes. Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting, quoting llttlz, 397 U.S. at 673).
Breadth of coverage would be required constitutionally only where exemption was not
July 20011	 Rationale fin . Mx Code Prohibitions	 919
A third rationale supporting the ban asserts that political activity
is incompatible with section 501 (c) (3) exempt purposes. 61 Neither
political activity nor lobbying activity is inherently charitable or relig-
ious. Such activities nonetheless may be the means to accomplish ex-
empt purposes. There is no logical reason to distinguish political ac-
tivity, which is prohibited entirely, from lobbying activity, which is
merely limited, and litigation activity, which is deemed an appropriate
means of achieving exempt purposes.62
IV. LESSONS IN FREE EXERCISE
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof."65 Traditional Free Exercise analysis had maintained that
facially neutral laws or regulations may violate the First Amendment if
they unduly burden the free exercise of religion. 64 The critical issue
was "whether government ht[d] placed a substantial burden on the
observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether
a compelling governmental interest justifie[d] the burden." 65
This traditional compelling-state-interest standard for evaluating
Free Exercise cases was largely dismantled in .Employment Division v.
Smith, in which the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
did not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a neu-
tral, generally applicable criminal statute against the use of peyote
specifically of exclusively jitstilied as ":11i intentional and reasonable accoinmodation of
religion." Id. at 39-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
61 Early American common law did not insist on abstention from political activity as a
prerequisite to clutritability. This view generally developed only after charitable organiza-
dolls were accorded tax "benefits." See, e.g., John Michael Clean Note, Political Spetyll of
("writable thganizations Under the internal Revenue Code, 41 U. Cm L. REv. 352, 307 (1974):
Edward W. Wachtel, David Meets Goliath in the Legislative Arena, 1) SAN q IEGO L. Rear. 944,
9474S (1972). Aliliottgli a mist to protium! the success of a part icular political party is not
considered clmritable, the charitahility of a trust promoting a particular cause is not de-
feated by the fact that a political party aclvocates the same cause. See Rr...sTATENtENT (SEG-
oND)..or TRusTs § 374 cult, k (1959); IVA Scorr ON TRUSTS § 374.0 (4th ed. 1989); Note.
Charitable Mists for Political Purposes, 37 VA. L. REV. 988, 989-93 (1951). At least one early
decision recognized the charitability of a trust supporting a political party if its goal was to
support a particular cause by this. means -, See Buell v. Gardner, 83 Misc. 513, 519-20 (NA'.
Sup. Ct. 1914).
62 See Goi. Coin's. Mem. 37.661 (Aug. 30, 1978); Rev. Rid. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175
(organization engaged in enviromilental litigation qualified for exemption inflict. section
501 (c2; (3)).
65 U.S. CONS • . Milt: WI. I.
61 See Wisconsin r. lirdcr, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
65 Hernandez v. Comin'r, 4410 U.S. 080, 6941 (1989)•
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that only incidentally burdened religious exercise. 66 In the Court's
view, only if prohibiting the exercise of religion were the object of the
statute would the First Amendment be offended. 67
 Smith essentially
eliminated the requirement that government justify burdens on relig-
ious exercise by compelling interests. The Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act ("RFRA") was enacted in 1993 to restore the least-restrictive-
means/compelling-state-interest standard that existed prior to Smith. 68
Against this background, the political activity prohibition unques-
tionably burdens free exercise of religion, which includes the right to
preach, teach, and proselytize, by requiring churches to choose be-
tween engaging in essential religious activities and the benefits of tax-
exemption.69
 This burden is increased by the prohibition's broad
scope as interpreted by the IRS, and the lack of clear standards for
determining the boundaries of prohibited activity. Although an out-
right ban on religious speech would violate the Free Exercise Clause,
the political activity prohibition does not operate as such a ban." It
does not claim to "deprive [the organization] of its constitutionally
guaranteed right of free speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such
activities without restraint, subject, however, to withholding of the ex-
emption, or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain from such
activities and obtain the privilege of exemption. " 71
Churches find the reality of their choice—between the burdens
of taxation and protected religious exercise—to be fundamentally re-
pugnant. Their dilemma, however, engenders little judicial sympathy.
In recent cases, judicial reaction to church arguments essentially has
been that churches "protest too much," that the burdens on free ex-
ercise imposed by taxation of religion have been overstated. For ex-
ample, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the Su-
preme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of a neutrally-
applied sales and use tax on mail order sales of religious publica-
66
 See 494 U.S. 877, 882 {1990).
67
 See id. at 877-78.
GB RFRA provided that "Egli overnment may sithstantially litirden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that the application of the hutden ... is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000kb-I (h) (1994). RFRA was found
unconstitutional as applied to the'sutics in City of Boerne a Flores., 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1097).
GY Stv McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
7° Cf. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 578 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 114 (1943). In these cases, the imposition of a license lee as a condition ofitrose-
Iytizing or selling religious hooks, operating in effect as a prior restraint on religious
speech, was ft lllll d to violate the Free Exercise Clause.
71
 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972).
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tions. 72 Echoing its earlier decision in Hernandez v. Commissioner, a tax-
deductibility case, the Court determined that taxation, which merely
decreases the amount of money available for religious activities, does
not impose A. constitutionally significant burden on religious exer-
cise." Only if a flat tax were to operate as a prior restraint on the ex-
ercise of religious belief would the Free Exercise Clause require tax
exemption. 74 Evaluation of the burdens resulting from revocation of
section 501(c) (3) exemption evoked a similar reaction: "Because of
the unique treatment churches receive under the Internal Revenue
Code, the impact of the revocation is likely to be more symbolic than
substantial. "75
No matter how the burden is calculated, however, it must be
weighed against the state's interest in imposing it. Despite the fact.
that prevention-of-subsidy played no role in enactment of the political
activity prohibition, exemption-as-subsidy is solidly ensconced hi judi-
cial precedent, with scant likelihood it will be dislodged. Thus, within
this framework, the government successfully asserts a compelling state
interest in not subsidizing political activity. In addition, maintenance
of a.sound tax system was enshrined in the compelling state interest
pantheon in United States v. Lee, an unsuccessful Free Exercise chal-
lenge to the Social Security tax brought by an Amish employer. 76 As-
sertion of these state interests virtually guarantees failure of Free Ex-
ercise (or RFRA) challenges to the political activity prohibition.
Although earlier free-exercise and free-speech challenges to the
political activity prohibition had been unsuccessful, none had dealt
directly with the prohibition's application to churches qua churches.
Any illusion that churches would prevail in an encounter between the
protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause and the tax code
were dispelled, however, in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti. 77 Branch Minis-
tries operated the Church at Pierce Creek in Vestal, New York. Shortly
before the 1992 Presidential election, the Church placed full-page ads
71
 493 U.S. 378, 390 (1990).
73 490 U.S. 680, 680 (1989).
74 Seejimmy Swaggarl MinAiries, 493 U.S. at 388.
" Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Under section,
508 ) (I) (A) of the Code, churches arc not required to apply lOr tax-exempt status. They
may simply , hold themselves out as a section 501(0(3) organization and receive all Ihe
benefits of such stales, provided they refrain from prohibited political activity. Further,
even if section 501 (c) (3) is revoked, bona fide con tribtuions would likely be classified as
gifts, 'lot includible in gross income under the provisions of I.R.C. section 102.
76 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
77 211 F.3d al 142-43.
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in UM Today and the Washington Times, exhorting Christian readers
not to vote for Bill Clinton, and requesting donations to defray the
cost of the ads. The IRS revoked the Church's exemption oti the
grounds that it violated the political activity prohibition. The Church
filed suit, asserting that revocation of its tax-exempt status violated
statutory provisions, both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses
of the First Amendment, and RFRA. In addition, the church charged
that the IRS had engaged in selective prosecution. 78
 In a unique ar-
gument, characterized by the court as "more creative than persua-
sive," the Church also argued that the prohibition did not apply, to a
church, since the statute refers only to a "religious organization."79
The court ruled against the Church on all counts, concluding that the
IRS's revocation of the Church's exempt status neither violated the
Constitution nor exceeded its statutory authority."
Further legal challenges offer dim prospects of success, except as
they might erode the prohibition's edges to limit IRS interpretations
of its meaning and scope, as these currently preclude far more ":hair
outright endorsements or statements of opposition.'" To the extent
the prohibition infringes on the ability of churches to engage in issue
education or regulates the issue content of homilies, sermons and
other communications with church members, it stands on shakier
78
 The Church's selective prosecution claim was based upon evidence of numerous
candidate pulpit appearances during the 1992 election cycle, including "Reverend Jesse
Jackson, Senators Al Gore, Charles Robh, Frank Lmucitherg and Tont Harkin, Senaie can-
didates Oliver North and Harvey Gantt, Governors Bill Clinton, Mario Cuomo and Doug-
las Wilder, gubernatorial candidates James Gilmore, III and Don Beyers, Jr., Nlayors
ion Barry, Knit Schmoke and Rudolph Guiliani, and numerous others." Branch Ministries
v. Rossoni, 40 F. Stipp, 2(1 15. 21-22 (D.D.C. 1999), affil 211 F.3(1 137 (DC. Cir. 2000).
79 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3(1 at 141. The court responded that "[I]he simple answer, of
course, is that whereas not every religions organizat lint is a church, every church is a relig-
ious organization." 14.
In reaching its conclusion. the Court emphasized the Church's ability to Communi-
eate its sentiments about candidates 11(n -
 public office through alternate means, specifically,
by establishing a related section 501(0(4) organization, which in turn may establish a
PAC. See id. at 143. Indeed, this "alternative voice" for political expression was considered
essential to the constitutionality of the section 501(c) (3) lobbying restriction. See Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81
 The exceptionally broad scope of the political activity prohibition contrasts with i he
RITA standard, which regulates communications only to the extent they "expressly a(lvo-
rate the election or dcleat of a clearly identified candidate." Buckley v. Video, 424 U.S. 1,
80 (1976). The United States Catholic Conference has argued, unsuccessfUlly, for applica-
tion of a similar standard for interpreting the political activity prohibition of section
501(c) (3). See Lobbying and Political activities of Tax Exempt aganizations Before the House Sub-
comm. on Oversight, House Comm. on Ways and ,Means, 1.00th Cong., 1st Sess. 418, 428 (1987)
(statement of U.S. Cat I tolic Con ICYClIce)
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ground." While the prohibition itself may be constitutional, every IRS
interpretation is not.
V. RELIGION HAS No SPHERE
It is naive to assume that church political activity will cease with
Branch Ministties v. Rossotti. Chinches have played a pivotal role in
every important political struggle since (and including) national in-
dependence: the abolition of slavery, gambling, child labor, prostitu-
tion, temperance, the death penalty, the war in Vietnam, abortion,
and civil rights." They will continue to do so because they must.
America's Catholic bishops have stated that "leaders of the Church
have the right and duty to share the Church's teaching and to educate
Catholics on the moral dimensions of public life, so that they may
form their consciences in light of their faith."84
In their involvement in public life, churches offer unique contri-
butions. They speak with prophetic witness, address moral dimensions
of civic life, and maintain a voice set in opposition to political inter-
ests and secular cultural influences. This is what faith demands and
society deserves. "The exclusion of the moral factor from the policy
debate is purchased at a high price not only for our values but also in
terms of our interests.... To ignore the moral dimensions of public
policy is to forsake our constitutional heritage."85 Through the relig-
es
	
pulpit activities present difficult issues. Such activities constitute official
church action, and during political campaigns news media invariably report appearances
by political candidates from church pulpits. Even if' outright CildOrSeffient does not take
place. the appearance of endorsement is inevitable. In some instances, churches evidence
a 'wick and nod" approach to the prohibition. SrrCeci Connolly, Gorr. Gets Important BleSS•
ing al Ex-Congressman's Church, West. l'us't, Feb. 14, 2000, at A4 (quoting Rev. Floyd Flake:
1 don't do endorsements from across the pulpit because 1 never know who's otti there
watching the types of laws that govern separation of church and state. P.m I will say to you
this morning and you read it well: This AlI Gore] should he the next president of the
Tinned States."). One court concluded, without elaboration, that candidates speaking from
church pulpits was -substantially dissimilar" from the purchase of anti-candidate newspa-
per inns. SO! Branch Minishiet, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 22. The IRS recently ruled that a section
501(c) (3) organization that conducted joint mailings with a political candidate violated
the political activity prohibition by providing hint with it forum for his political views. See
Tech. Ads', Mem. 20-00-44038 (Noy 3, 2000). Pulpit access provides a similar -forum" lot•
political candidates.
83 See generally KELLEY, ,Su/la note 56 at 87-88; CARTER, SifPratiOle I, at 4-5.
61 Faithful Citizenship: Civic Responsibility for a New Millennium, Statentent of the Adminis-
trative Board of the U.S. Catholic Bishops 12 (1990) iltereinafter Civic nrspottsiiii/ityl.
85 Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Archbishop of Chicago, Role of the Religious Leader in the
Develop went qf Public Policy, Address at the ABA Annual Convention. Chi,. III. (Aug. 4,
1984),
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iouS liberty protections engraved in the First Amendment, the Found-
ers intended a society that would honor the tensions of religious plu-
ralism, not eliminate them. The "wall" of separation between chinch
and state is merely metaphor. 86 "Religion cannot ... be confined by a
legal fiction."87
Yet this is exactly the sort of confinement fostered by the political
activity prohibition. Churches are pressured to vacate the public
sphere entirely or to alter their message in conformity with interpreta-
tions of the tax law. To do otherwise risks drawing the twill penalties
of loss of tax-exempt status and deductible contributions. The clash
between church and state on the field of tax exemption is unfortu-
nate and unworkable. The IRS is ill-equipped for front-line duty in an
area fraught with constitutional implications. Relying, as it must, on
media reports, and complaints filed by groups determined to elimi-
nate church participation from public' life in the name of separation
of church and state, or interest groups with contrary policy views, the
IRS invites charges of selective enforcement. 88 Interest group politics
played a significant role in the 1980 lawsuit filed by abortion clinic
operators and certain clergy challenging the tax-exempt status of the
United States Catholic Conference for allegedly engaging in prohib-
ited political activity as part of its efforts to educate the public con-
cerning its views on abortion. 89 Despite the conclusion by the Joint
86 "A rttle of Iaw should not be drawn from a figum of speech." McCollum v. Board of
Ethic., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed. J., dissenting). lite concept of a 'wall of separa-
tion' is a usefid figure of' siyeech Nut the metaphor itself is not. a wholly accurate de-
scription of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between clime)] and
stale." Lynch v. Dom II 465U.S.673 (1 984). Ste..y,	 generally CARTER, supra note I. at
74-79.
87 CARTER, 3//pra note 1 at 74.
88 I.R.C. section 7611 establishes safeguards against the IRS' conduct of church tax in-
quiries or examinations. Generally, section 7611 provides that the IRS may begin a chinch
tax inquiry only [won reasonable belief, based on faCts and circumstances recorded in
writing and with high-level approval, that is church may not qualify for tax exemption or
may be engaged in taxable activities. Special notice requirements, time limits fO• the dura-
tion of church examinations, and safeguards against repetitive inquiries are included.
Originally enacted as section 7605(c), these provisions were specifically intended "to pro-
tect churches from unnecessary tax audits in the interest of not interfering with the inter-
nal financial matters of churches." S. REP. No. 91-551, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. (1969), P169-3
C.B. 468. Indeed, in Branch Ministries, the Church at Pierce Creek argued that the IRS
enforced the political activity prohibition unfairly against churches to the right of the po-
litical spectrum. See 211 F.3t1 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Charges of discrianinatoiy en-
forcement were also raised in Christian Echoes Nat'l Illinishy, Inc. v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849, 857
(10111 Cir. 1972).
. 89 SecAbortion Rights Mobilization v. Bales, 885 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1989). Since
the suit was dismissed for lack of sta nding, no decisiint was reached on the merits.
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Committee on Taxation, after a three-year investigation, that there
was no credible evidence of political bias in IRS' grant of tax exemp-
tion or selection of tax-exempt organizations for audit, the perception
of an uneven playing field persists."
VI. PROPHET OR POWER BROKER?
'Church political involvement comes at a considerable price in
terms of integrity and independence. In addressing the moral diitteii-
sions of policy issues, churches are fulfilling their unique prophetic
role. In endorsing a particular candidate, party, or political platform,
however, they jeopardize that distinctive prophetic voice. A church
engaged in partisan politics becomes indistinguishable from myriad
interest groups competing in the political arena. The impact of such
loss is incalculable, because to the extent churches forfeit their dis-
tinctiveness, they forfeit as well their claim to special constitutional
protection. Professor Carter argues that "religions .. • will almost al-
ways lose their best, most spiritual selves when they choose to be in-
volved in the partisan, electoral side of American politiCs." 91 Catholic
bishops have expressly disavowed such involvement, stating that "[a]s
bishops, we do not seek the formation of a religious voting bloc, nor
do we wish to instruct persons on how they should vote by endorsing
or opposing candidates. "92
To the extent that churches venture into the realm of partisan
electoral politics, they also jeopardize their institutional autonomy, an
essential component of religious liberty." Partisan politics pulls to-
ward power. Power corrupts. To obtain and maintain power requires
compromise. A compromised church no longer "speaks truth to
power." A politicized church has lost its independence." Much has
90 See Ryan J. Donmoyer, MS Cleared of Bias Charges Levied by Conservative E0s. 28 Ex-
Etorr ORG. "I'Ax REV. 14 (2000),
91 CARTER, SUpralkOle 1, at 1.
92. Civic Responsibility, supra note 84.: at 12; see also Statement On Political Neutrality.
Office of the First Presidency, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Oct. 19, 1999)
Chilli this election year we reaffirm dm policy of strict political neutrality f or the Church.
The Church does not endorse political candidates or parties in elections nor dues it advise
its members how to vole.").
•3 SM Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental Funding, 60
GEo. WAsti. L. RE.v. 645, 660-65 (1992). "The concept of institutional autonomy for the
Religion Clauses is sununed tip in the following sentence: The governnunit has no relig-
ious role., religions histitntigns enjoy no secular governance." Id. at 662.
91 Similar concerns are raised about Bush Adniinisiration proposals for faith-based ini-
tiatives. See Thomas B. Edsall, Charity Aid ll'orries Some Conservatives, WAsii. Post, Feb. 17,
2001, at MO; Thomas B. Edsall, Jewish Leaders Criticize 'Faith-Based' Initiative, WAsi POST,
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been written of the alignment of conservative Christian churches with
the Republican Party and of African-American congregations with
Democrats, from the standpoint of gains to the respective political
parties.95
 Little has been written of what churches have lost in the
process.
A document from the Second Vatican Council expresses' the
Catholic understanding: "The Church, by reason of her role and
competence, is not identified in any way with the political community
nor bound to any political system. She is at once a sign and a safe-
guard of the transcendent character of the human person."96 'The
primary purpose of any church is religious. As it pursues its religious
mission, the church is guided by its own transcendent vision of how
society should be structured. As a God-given vision, it admits of no
compromise. Yet compromise is the sine qua non of politics. - For this
reason, "politics is a very dangerous place for institutions concerned
with spiritual matters that transcend ordinary human striving."97 In
choosing involvement in electoral politics, the church risks coin pro-
mise, co-option, and collusion. A religious message without integrity is
no message at al1.93
CONCLUSION
After almost fifty years, it is tempting to assume that the political
activity prohibition has always been part of the law. It has not. Steeped
in separationist rhetoric, it is tempting to assume that the political ac-
tivity prohibition is constitutionally mandated. It is not. Imbued with
free exercise fervor, it is tempting to insist that rights to political ex-
pression always be fully exercised. For churches, they should not.
It is ironic that the political activity prohibition, perceived in
many church circles as an unjustifiable and offensively intrusive.bur-
den on free exercise of religion, might actually serve the interests of
religious freedom and pluralism precisely because it provides an ob-
Feb. 27, 2001, at A4; In Good Faith, A Dialogue on Government Funding of 1aith-13mM. Social
Services 14, Feinstein Center for American Jewish History (2001). But see Thomas B. Edsall
& Dana Milbank, Blunt Defense of nith-BasoF Aid, WA Posr, Mar. 8, 2001, at A8.
95 See, e.g., William Raspherry,,At the Church of the Democratic Party. WASH. Pos•, Dec. 18,
2000, at A27 (1 think ... that ihe Democratic Party has become a sort of secular Baptist
church for African Americans.."); CARTER, ROM note 1, at 35-39.
9G
 PASTORAL. CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD 1 76 (1965:%.
97 CARTER, SUPia Dole 1, at 6.
" See CARTER, SUpra DOR! 1, at 57 (quoting Cal Thomas: it people claim to roilow jest's
and his kingdom gets too cozy with government. it won't be government that gets injured.
It will be the church that gets compromised.").
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stacle to church participation in partisan electoral politics. Threat of
loss of tax-exempt status is not an absolute bar to partisan electoral
politics. Yet. it presents serious enough consequences to require
churches to pause and weigh carefully what is to be gained and what is
to be lost by a decision to endorse or oppose candidates, to insist that
one party has the corner on God's agenda, to instruct their faithful
that a vote for one candidate is pleasing to God, a vote for the other
sinful. Whether such partisan involvement improves society is debat-
able. That it would harm churches is not.
Absent the political activity prohibition, churches would be free
to endorse candidates, W support political parties and their agendas
and to tell members how, they should vote. 99 Yet, there is little indica-
tion that religious congregations want to be told•how to vote by their
churches or religious leaders. A Pew Research Center study indicates
that members generally reject such a role by their churches, as a ma-
jority disapproved clergy discussing politics from the pulpit. 199 The
Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate has reported an even
stronger negative reaction among Catholics. Only 13 percent of those
polled wanted priests to urge support or opposition for specific can-
didates. 1 ° 1
The fate of H.R. 2910, a 1996 bill that would have amended sec-
tion 501(c) (3) to permit churches and certain religious organizations
to engage in liMited political 'expenditures, suggests that churches
may understand this niessage. 102 The bill failed to garner significant
99 To he sure, certain forms Of political activity would continue to be prohibited. For
example, churches that are incorporated would continue to be prohibited under H.C,A
from making contributions to political candidates. In addition, they could not operate {Ol-
die private benefit Of candidates withinn jeopardizing tax exemption under section
501(0(3). See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1075 (1989) (operation of
the campaign school provided more than incidental benefit to .Republican entities a nd
candidates). In addition, campaign reform legislation currently under consideration in
Congress would place additional restrictions on political contributions and issue advertis-
ing.
1"" Sixty-four percent of voters polled believed it was wrong for clergymen to discuss
politics front the pulpit. See Religion and Politics: The Antbivalen1 Majority, Pew Research Cen-
ter for the People & the Press Campaign 2000 Typology Survey 5 (2001).
101 See Political 1-}afrrences of American' Catholics on the Eve of the 2000 Elections—American
Catholic in the Public Squaw, GARA, Georgetown Univ., 36 (Oct. 2000). Forty-nine percent
approved priests addressing the Church's teaching on particular issues.
10.2 H.R. 2910, 104Ith Cong. (2d Scss.1996) was introduced by Congressmen Crane, and
Rangel to clarify the restrictions on lobbying and political activities of churches. The new
provision would have applied to, churches and certain other religious organizations de-
scribed in section 501(10(5) that are ineligible to make the section 501(11) lobbying dee-
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support among church denominations and was not enacted. The
primary deficiency of this. seemingly well-intentioned legislative effort
was its failure to consider that churches might not perceive the ability
to endorse political candidates as a beneficial outcome. In their 1995
Statement on Political Responsibility, Catholic bishops recognized the
risks of following the political path, when they asserted that telling
people how to vote "would be in our view, pastorally inappropriate,
theologically unsound, and politically unwise.'"3 Would churches in-
structing people how to vote be any less pastorally inappropriate, theo-
logically unsound, or politically unwise if it were not prohibited by the
tax laws? I think not.
This is not, however, a brief for the status quo. Even if one ac-
cepts the premise that church involvement in partisan electoral poli-
tics is not a good thing, there is nonetheless much that is wrong with
section 501(c) (3). 104 IRS interpretations of the political activity prohi-
bition are unacceptably vague and extend far beyond the range of
reasonableness, particularly as applied to voter education. Because
the political activity prohibition impinges on the • free exercise rights
of churches, it is incumbent upon the IRS to interpret the provision
narrowly, clearly, and impartially. The prohibition should be limited
to explicit endorsements of or opposition to political candidates and
other clear and unambiguous support, financial or otherwise. Discus-
sion of issues should never constitute prohibited political activity. The
obligation of churches to address the moral implications of policy is-
sues is not suspended during political campaigns, even if discussion of
issues invariably involves candidates aligned on one side or another.
Voter education materials should not constitute prohibited political
activity unless they contain explicit statements of support for or oppo-
sition to a candidate, rate candidates as acceptable or unacceptable,
or contain specific voting instructions.
The current situation is untenable. Faced with the extraordinary
scope of the prohibition as interpreted by the IRS, and perceived non-
lion, See H.R. 2910, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996). Expenditures would have been limited
generally to 5 percent of gross revenues. Id.
109 Political Responsthility Proclaiming The Gospel of Life, Protecting the Least Among Us, and
Paming flu' Commoh Good, A Statement of the Administrative Board of the United States
Catholic. Conference 7 (Sept. 1995).
104 See Commentary on IRS 1992 CPE Text, prepared by individual members of the
Subcomm. on Political and Lobbying Activities and Oig., Comm. on Exempt Org., A.B.A.
Sec. Tax'n (Feb. 21, 1995), 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 854 (1995); Deirdre Dessingue &
Wilfred R. Caron, /.R.	 § 501(001: Practical and Constitutional Implications of "Political"
Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L.	 Pot... 169, 200 (1985).
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enforcement of egregious violations, such as broadly publicized visits
of high-profile candidates to church pulpits and collection baskets
passed to benefit candidates, churches tend toward one of two ex-
tremes: they either ignore the prohibition and endorse candidates
because of misguided confidence in First Amendment inin ► mity or
IRS inaction or they avoid legitimate involvement with important pol-
icy issues during campaign periods, out of unwarranted 'fear of IRS
reprisals. Neither response is beneficial for church or society.
